Responding to the threat of bioterrorism: a microbial ecology perspective—the case of anthrax by R. Atlas
REVIEW ARTICLE
R.M. Atlas
Responding to the threat of bioterrorism: a microbial ecology
perspective – the case of anthrax
Received: 15 March 2002 /Accepted: 20 April 2002 / Published online: 20 August 2002
 Springer-Verlag and SEM 2002
Abstract Anthrax is a disease of herbivores caused by
the gram-positive bacterium Bacillus anthracis. It can
aﬀect cattle, sheep, swine, horses and various species of
wildlife. The routes for the spread among wildlife are
reviewed. There are three kinds of human anthrax –
inhalation, cutaneous, and intestinal anthrax – which
diﬀer in their routes of infection and outcomes. In the
United States, conﬁrmation of cases is made by the
isolation of B. anthracis and by biochemical tests. Vac-
cination is not recommended for the general public;
civilians who should be vaccinated include those who, in
their work places, come in contact with products po-
tentially contaminated with B. anthracis spores, and
people engaged in research or diagnostic activities.
After September 11, 2001, there were bioterrorism an-
thrax attacks in the United States: anthrax-laced letters
sent to multiple locations were the source of infectious
B. anthracis. The US Postal Service issued recommen-
dations to prevent the danger of hazardous exposure to
the bacterium. B. anthracis spores can spread easily and
persist for very long times, which makes decontamina-
tion of buildings very diﬃcult. Early detection, rapid
diagnosis, and well-coordinated public health response
are the key to minimizing casualties. The US Govern-
ment is seeking new ways to deter bioterrorism, includ-
ing a tighter control of research on infectious agents,
even though pathogens such as B. anthracis are widely
spread in nature and easy to grow. It is necessary to
deﬁne the boundary between defensive and oﬀensive
biological weapons research. Deterring bioterrorism
should not restrict critical scientiﬁc research.
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Introduction
The post-September 11 anthrax attack on the United
States has highlighted the importance of microbial
ecology in responding to the threat of bioterrorism.
Although anthrax is primarily a zoonotic disease that
aﬀects herbivores, it is transmissible to humans through
handling or consumption of contaminated animal
products. It is caused by the gram-positive, endospore-
forming bacterium Bacillus anthracis (Fig. 1). The
spores of B. anthracis can persist in soil, which is its
natural reservoir, for many years. Inhalation of en-
dospores by animals can lead to disease; spores can also
enter via ingestion of contaminated foods or via wounds
and are readily disseminated when carcasses of dead
animals are scavenged. Anthrax is widespread in South
and Central America, the Caribbean, Southern and
Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. An
understanding of both the infectious process and the
ecology of the causal agent can help to prevent the use of
anthrax as a biological weapon.
Among livestock, anthrax most commonly aﬀects
cattle, sheep, swine, and horses. Anthrax also infects
various species of wildlife. It is endemic in the Kruger
National Park in South Africa, the Etosha National
Park, Namibia, and probably in some of the other game
parks in southern Africa, where sporadic small or larger
outbreaks aﬀect a wide variety of species of wildlife from
time to time; signiﬁcant cyclical outbreaks occurring
about every 10 years. Anthrax aﬀects baboon, lion,
leopard, cheetah, elephant, hippopotamus, zebra, wart-
hog, bushpig, giraﬀe, African buﬀalo, and all antelopes–
especially kudu.
Among African wildlife, there are three distinct epi-
demiological routes for the spread of anthrax: (1) The
kudu/blowﬂy cycle. Blowﬂies feed on the body ﬂuids of
infected carcasses of kudu and then alight on leaves of
nearby plants, often at heights of 1–2 m above the
ground, which is the same height at which kudu graze.
Defecation and droplet deposition by the blowﬂies
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contaminate the leaves and lead to transmission of
B. anthracis to grazing kudu. Blowﬂies also lay eggs in
the decaying carcasses of kudu so that as the pupae
develop they also acquire spores of B. anthracis. Thus,
the cycle of transmission of anthrax continues and am-
pliﬁes. (2) The vulture/water hole route. Vultures that
have fed on contaminated carcasses in turn contaminate
watering holes. Vultures actually kill vegetative forms of
B. anthracis as the bacterial cells pass through the vul-
ture’s digestive system, but spores survive and are dis-
seminated by fecal deposition and via contaminated feet
and feathers of the vulture. Thus, there is continuous
contamination of the water holes with spores of B. an-
thracis. Any wildlife drinking the contaminated water
can then become infected. African buﬀalo and elephants
are especially susceptible to this route of transmission as
they frequent watering holes in large numbers and often
stir up the sediment. Many infected animals die near the
watering hole, increasing the likelihood of transmission
via this route. (3) Direct carcass-predator cycle of
transmission. Lions, leopards, jackals, and wild dogs can
ingest billions of spores of B. anthracis while feeding on
infected prey. Therefore, epidemics of anthrax can im-
pact a variety of wildlife animals. Seasonal and regional
diﬀerences in rates of anthrax-associated mortalities
reﬂect the underlying ecological distribution of spores of
B. anthracis. The widespread natural distribution of
B. anthracis endospores means that this deadly bacteri-
um can readily be acquired from nature.
Facts about anthrax
Bacillus anthracis produces three toxin components,
protective antigen, lethal factor, and edema factor [21],
and a capsule that are critical for its high virulence [14].
Vegetative bacteria have poor survival expectancies
outside an animal or human host, colony counts de-
clining to undetectable within 24 h following incubation
into water [27]. This contrasts with B. anthracis spores,
which can survive for decades [Friedlander AM (2001)
Anthrax. http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/history/
borden/cwbw].
The three forms of human anthrax are: inhalation
anthrax, cutaneous or skin anthrax, and intestinal an-
thrax. They diﬀer entirely by the route of infection and
have very diﬀerent outcomes. Cutaneous anthrax, which
is the most common form (95%), results from inocula-
tion of spores under the skin. After incubation for a few
hours to 7 days, a small papule forms that gives rise to
an ulcer surrounded by vesicles (24–28 h). The forma-
tion of a painless eschar with edema follows; the death
rate in untreated cases is less than 20% and almost all
individuals treated with antibiotics recover. Ingestion of
contaminated meat results in gastrointestinal anthrax,
which is characterized by an acute inﬂammation of the
intestinal tract. Initial signs of nausea, loss of appetite,
vomiting and fever are followed by abdominal pain,
vomiting of blood, and severe diarrhea. The rate of
fatality is estimated to be 25–60%. Inhalation of spores
from animals or wool from infected animals, resulting in
inhalation anthrax, is highly fatal even when treated
with antibiotics. After incubation of 1–43 days (maybe
longer), initial inﬂuenza-like symptoms including fever,
cough, myalgia, and malaise develop; these are followed
by high fever, dyspnea, cyanosis, hemorrhagic medias-
tinitis/pleural eﬀusion and rapid progression to shock/
death. Anthrax is not a contagious disease. Person-to-
person transmission of inhalation anthrax is highly im-
probable, thus no quarantine procedures are necessary.
There is no need to immunize or treat contacts of per-
sons ill with anthrax, such as household contacts,
friends, or coworkers, unless they were also exposed to
the same source of infection.
In the mid-1800s, inhalation anthrax related to the
textile industry became known as wool-sorters’ disease
(in England) and rag-pickers’ disease (in Germany and
Austria) because of the frequency of infection in mill
workers exposed to imported animal ﬁbers contami-
nated with B. anthracis spores. In the early 1900s, hu-
man cases of inhalation anthrax occurred in the United
States in conjunction with the textile and tanning in-
dustries. Of the 18 cases of inhalation anthrax reported
in the United States in the twentieth century [5–8, 10, 16,
18–20,23], most were related to exposure to animal
products, primarily in textile mills processing goat hair,
Fig. 1 Transmission electron micrograph of Bacillus anthracis
from an anthrax culture, showing cell division (A), and spores (B)
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goatskins, or wool. In the last decades of the twentieth
century, with improved industrial hygiene practices and
restrictions on imported animal products, the number of
cases fell dramatically [3].
According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), a conﬁrmed case of anthrax is
deﬁned as a clinically compatible case of cutaneous,
inhalational, or gastrointestinal illness that is laborato-
ry-conﬁrmed by isolation of B. anthracis from an
aﬀected tissue or site, or other laboratory evidence of
B. anthracis infection. Regarding the detection of an-
thrax spores, a variety of methods are being employed.
At its simplest level, a number of clinical laboratories are
screening samples by microscopy for the presence or
absence of structures resembling the spores of Bacillus
species. This can help rule out the possible presence of
B. anthracis. Additional culture methods are being used
in which swabs of environmental samples and human
nasal swabs are used to inoculate media that permit the
growth of B. anthracis. After 24 h the media are exam-
ined for the presence of colonies typical of B. anthracis.
This bacterium is non-motile, so the colonies do not
spread, and also non-hemolytic, so blood cells included
in the medium do not lyse and thus there is no zone of
clearing around the colonies. Clinical laboratories use
additional conventional biochemical tests for the iden-
tiﬁcation of pathogens, including B. anthracis (Fig. 2).
The CDC has issued interim guidelines for the man-
agement of exposed individuals and antimicrobial
therapy regimes for those with cutaneous and inhalation
anthrax. For both inhalation and cutaneous anthrax,
ciproﬂoxacin and doxycycline are the ﬁrst-line therapies
[3, 14, 17]. The inappropriate use of antibiotics, how-
ever, can produce adverse reactions and be worse than
the actual threat of anthrax.
Anthrax vaccine
Vaccination of livestock, often with the non-capsulated,
avirulent Sterne strain, is used to prevent the spread of
anthrax. As long as vaccination is carried out, there is
eﬀective control of this disease. But because of the en-
vironmental persistence of B. anthracis, the danger al-
ways exists that anthrax will occur if adequate
vaccination is not carried out. This became evident in
Zimbabwe in the late 1970s when war interrupted the
vaccination program and a major epizootic of anthrax
occurred among cattle.
Many grazing animals are protected against anthrax
by vaccination, but the vaccine used for livestock is not
the same as the human vaccine. Vaccination against
anthrax is not recommended for the general public to
prevent disease and is not available. The anthrax vaccine
licensed for human use in the United States is a cell-free
ﬁltrate that contains protective antigen and alum. The
vaccine is reported to be 93% eﬀective in protecting
against cutaneous anthrax. Animal studies have
Fig. 2 Bacillus anthracis
identiﬁcation ﬂowchart. From
clinical samples, such as blood,
CSF, or lesion material: encap-
sulated gram-positive rods with
spores that are non-swelling
and oval shaped, as well as the
ground-glass appearance of
colonies that are non-motile
and non-hemolytic yields a
presumptive identiﬁcation of
B. anthracis
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suggested vaccine may also be protective against aerosol
challenge. The anthrax vaccine is distributed by BioPort
Corporation (Lansing, Michigan). Because B. anthracis
is considered a potential biological warfare threat agent,
the US Department of Defense recommends anthrax
vaccination of all US active duty military personnel.
According to the Advisory Committee for Immuniza-
tion Practices (ACIP), civilians who should receive an-
thrax vaccine include people who, in their workplaces,
come in contact with imported animal hides, furs,
bonemeal, wool, animal hair (especially goat hair) and
bristles, as well as people engaged in diagnostic or re-
search activities that may put them in contact with an-
thrax spores. The vaccine should be administered only to
healthy men and women aged 18–65 years since all
studies to date have been conducted exclusively in that
population. Pregnant women should not be vaccinated,
because it is not known whether the anthrax vaccine can
cause fetal harm.
The anthrax vaccination protocol consists of three
subcutaneous injections given 2 weeks apart followed by
three additional subcutaneous injections given at 6, 12,
and 18 months. Annual booster injections of the vaccine
are required to maintain immunity. Approximately 30%
of recipients have mild local reactions consisting of slight
tenderness and redness at the injection site of the skin. A
moderate local reaction can occur if the vaccine is given
to anyone with a past history of anthrax. Severe local
reactions consisting of extensive swelling of the forearm
in addition to the local reaction can occur infrequently.
Systemic reactions characterized by ﬂu-like symptoms
occur from less than 0.2% of vaccinations [3, 15, 28].
Bioterrorism after September 11
After the ﬁrst September 2001 anthrax attacks, many felt
that increased acts of terrorism coupled with the easy
acquisition and mass-production of many lethal micro-
organisms and toxins meant that bioterrorism was an
inevitable reality [1, 4, 11, 12, 13, 26]. In the wake of
these bioterrorist anthrax attacks, there has been a need
to provide information to the public and the medical
community about anthrax. The following is taken
largely from several previous reports on the etiology,
pathology, epidemiology, and identity of anthrax [9, 22,
25] and from CDC releases about the disease that were
posted at the CDC Web site http://www.bt.cdc.gov
during October 2001 [3]. The CDC has been made re-
sponsible for controlling the shipment of pathogens and
toxins that were deemed most likely for potential misuse
as biological weapons Table 1 lists those agents whose
transport and manipulation are regulated by the CDC
[2].
What is known is that on September 18, 2001, one
week after the hijacked airplanes crashed into the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, anthrax-laced letters
were sent from Trenton, New Jersey, to the New York
Post and NBC Broadcasting Studios in New York City.
A letter may also have been sent at that time to Amer-
ican Media in Boca Raton, Florida and to other media
outlets. By September 21, an editorial assistant at the
New York Post showed signs of cutaneous anthrax. A
day later, a worker at the Hamilton, New Jersey, postal
distribution center, where letters from Trenton would
Table 1 Select agents whose shipment is regulated by the CDC under the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [2]
Virusesa
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus Yersinia pestis
Eastern equine encephalitis virus Coxiella burnetiiRickettsia prowazekii
Ebola virus Ricketsia rickettsii
Equine morbillivirus Fungi
Lassa fever virus Coccidioides immitis
Marburg virus Toxinsc
Rift Valley fever virus Abrin
South American hemorrhagic fever viruses
(Junin, Machopa, Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)
Aﬂatoxins
Tick-borne encephalitis complex viruses Botulinum toxins
Variola major virus (smallpox virus) Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Conotoxins
Viruses causing hantavirus pulmonary syndrome Diacetoxyscirpenol
Yellow fever virus Ricin
Bacteriab Saxitoxin
Bacillus anthracis Shigatoxin
Brucella abortus, B. melitensis, B. suis Staphylococcal enterotoxins
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei Tetrodotoxin
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei T-2 toxin
Francisella tularensis
aExemptions: vaccine strains of viral agents (Junin virus strain candid, Rift Valley fever virus strain MP–12, Venezuelan equine
encephalitis virus strain TC–83, and yellow fever virus strain 17–D) are exempt
bExemptions: vaccine strains as described in Title 9 CFR, 78.1 are exempt
cExemptions: Toxins for medical use. Inactivated for use as vaccines, or toxin preparations for biomedical research use at an LD50 for
vertebrates of more than 100 ng per kg of body weight are exempt. National standard toxins required for biologic potency testing as
described in 9 CFR Part 113 are exempt
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have passed, also showed the ﬁrst signs of cutaneous
anthrax. A few days later, a mail-room worker at
American Media showed possible signs of inhalation
anthrax. Robert Stevens of America Media also devel-
oped signs of inhalation anthrax; the diagnosis of an-
thrax was conﬁrmed on October 4 and he died the
following day, becoming the ﬁrst tragic victim of the
anthrax bioterrorism attack. Additional cases of cuta-
neous anthrax occurred among a few New Jersey postal
workers and among several people associated with the
news media in New York City.
These cases clearly showed the airborne spread of
B. anthracis spores causing inhalation anthrax and that
contact with contaminated surfaces was causing the less
serious form of cutaneous anthrax. On October 9, ad-
ditional anthrax-laced letters were sent to Senators Tom
Daschle and Patrick Leahy at their Congressional Oﬃ-
ces. Following the opening of the Daschle letter, nu-
merous Senate oﬃce workers were placed on
prophylactic ciproﬂoxacin or doxycycline treatment.
The Hart Senate Oﬃce Building was closed for months
and all Senate mail was sealed – including the letter to
Senator Leahy, which was not discovered for many
weeks. Still the impending risk to postal workers was not
yet realized and postal workers were not given prophy-
lactic antibiotics. A week later, several postal workers at
the District of Columbia Brentwood postal facility de-
veloped inhalation anthrax– two died. Additional postal
workers at the Hamilton, New Jersey, facility also de-
veloped anthrax but recovered. Subsequently, a woman
in New York City, not associated with the media or
postal facilities, developed a fatal case of inhalation
anthrax, as did a 94-year old Connecticut woman. These
individuals may have been exposed through cross-con-
taminated mail that had passed through the Hamilton,
New Jersey, postal sorting facility.
By mid November, 17 cases of anthrax – seven of the
cutaneous form and ten of inhalation anthrax, four of
which were fatal – had been detected (Table 2). Of the
ten inhalation anthrax cases, seven occurred in postal
employees in New Jersey and the District of Columbia
who had probably been exposed to letters known to be
contaminated with B. anthracis spores. Of the aﬀected
people, two were employees of a media company in
Florida: one is believed to have received contaminated
mail, the other to have sorted and distributed that mail.
The last case was a resident of New York city, and the
nature of her exposure to B. anthracis remains unknown.
Another fatal case subsequently occurred in Connecticut
in which secondary contamination of a letter that passed
through the New Jersey mail sorting center is suspected
as the source of infection [3].
There was widespread fear across the nation. Many
people imagined they had been exposed, and numerous
hoaxes fueled the hysteria as fear of the mail spread. The
US Postal Service issued recommendations to try to
reduce the dangers:
– Do not handle the mail piece or package suspected of
contamination.
– Damaged or suspicious packages should be isolated
and the immediate area cordoned oﬀ.
– All persons who have touched the mail piece should
wash their hands with soap and water.
– Notify local law enforcement authorities.
– List all persons and their contact information who
have touched the letter and/or envelope for the au-
thorities.
– Place all items worn when in contact with the suspect
mail piece in plastic bags for law enforcement agents.
– As soon as practical, shower with soap and water.
– Contact CDC Emergency Response with any ques-
tions.
Bioterrorists do not need to rely upon culture col-
lections to supply potential bioweapons. In the post-
September 11 anthrax bioterrorism events in the United
States, however, it appears that a bioterrorist acquired
the Ames strain, which had been initially cultured from a
dead cow in Texas and deposited with the US Army Lab
in Maryland. The strain was subsequently transferred to
the US Army Infectious Disease Research Laboratory
(USAMRIID), which distributed it to other government
laboratories within the United States and Britain. The
British laboratory at Porton Down also sent it to
Louisiana State University, so that at least ﬁve labora-
tories were known to have received the Ames strain.
Somehow, a bioterrorist also acquired the Ames strain.
(At the writing of this article, both the identity of the
bioterrorist and the source of the Ames strain are
unknown.)
The powerful contamination by spores
Clearly, biological weapons have the potential for
causing mass casualties. The estimation of casualties
from a hypothetical biological attack with several mi-
croorganisms is shown in Table 3 [3].
In retrospect, it is clear that spores of 1–2 lm can
pass directly through an envelope. This apparently was
Table 2 Number of cases of anthrax, by site, September-October 2001 [Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2001) Update:
Investigation of bioterrorism-related anthrax and adverse events from antimicrobial prophylaxis, 50:973–976]
Florida New York City District of Columbia New Jersey Connecticut Total
Inhalation conﬁrmed 2 1 5 2 1 11
Cutaneous conﬁrmed 0 6 0 5 0 11
Total 2 7 5 7 1 22
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known to some within the bioweapons research com-
munity. Canadian researchers had warned as early as
October 4, 2001, that spores of B. anthracis could pass
through the walls of tightly sealed envelopes. But this
risk was not recognized within the public health com-
munity as the CDCs and others responded to the an-
thrax attack. Nor was it known to the broader scientiﬁc
community that the spores in the Daschle and Leahy
letters had been reﬁned to produce ‘‘weaponized an-
thrax,’’ with reduced electrostatic charge so that the
spores acted more like a gas than a particle. As the
postal sorting machines pressed against the envelopes,
clouds of spores spread through the postal facility and
also contaminated machinery and subsequent letters.
Later investigations indicated that the spores did not
adhere to surfaces in an irreversible manner as had
previously been thought. Thus, months after contami-
nation at the Hart Senate Oﬃce Building spores still
readily became airborne and spread with minimal dis-
turbance.
Given the threat posed by contaminated mail and
buildings, investigations were quickly carried out to
determine eﬀective decontamination procedures. Studies
at the British bioweapons defense facility at Porton
Down had shown that 41.5 kGray of irradiation could
kill 99.9% of the spores of B. anthracis. The US postal
system turned to electron-beam technology to irradiate
mail and eliminate any threat of viable anthrax spores.
This has proven diﬃcult, in part because of the geometry
of electron-beam technology for generating suﬃcient
radiation energy and in part because of the heat gener-
ated in the process; some mail has caught ﬁre and
burned. Also, given the bulk of US mail that is processed
daily, there is no suﬃcient electron-beam capacity. Thus,
most mail is untreated.
Building contamination represented an additional
problem. Several attemps to eliminate viable anthrax
spores from the Hart Senate Oﬃce Building using
chlorine dioxide fumigation initially failed. Eventually,
by adjusting the humidity, the building was decontami-
nated and reopened. Nearly a year later, attempts are
being made to decontaminate the postal facilities that
were heavily contaminated by the letters sent to Senators
Daschle and Leahy. Given that it may be nearly im-
possible to eliminate all viable spores, an important
question remains – what is the concentration of anthrax
spores needed to cause a fatal infection of inhalation
anthrax? Based on animal studies and epidemiological
investigation following the 1979 accidental release of
anthrax spores from a bioweapons facility at Sverdlosk
(currently, Ekaterinburg, Russia) in the former Soviet
Union, it had been thought that exposure to 8,000–
10,000 spores was necessary to cause inhalation anthrax.
But the deaths in New York City and Connecticut
suggest that a much lower concentration could suﬃce,
especially in the elderly or in immuno-suppressed indi-
viduals. Thus, the level of decontamination necessary to
protect fully the health of workers in contaminated
buildings is unknown.
Measures to deter bioterrorism
Hence, at what seems to be the end of this wave of the
anthrax attack, we can pause to ask what we know and
what we have learned. Clearly, we are extremely vul-
nerable to bioterrorist attacks. Even a few contaminated
letters and a relatively few cases can wreak panic across
the nation. We have also learned that spores are easily
spread and very persistent. There are means of disin-
fection, but these are diﬃcult. There are also means of
prophylaxis and treatment that can greatly reduce
lethality. Early detection, rapid diagnosis, and a well-
coordinated public health response are critical for min-
imizing casualties. Preparedness is key to protecting
against bioterrorism.
Yet, even as the investigation to ﬁnd who sent the
anthrax-laced letters continues, the US Government is
seeking new ways of deterring bioterrorism. Major re-
search funding will be available to ﬁnd vaccines and
drugs that will ensure that the population is protected
against the major biothreat agents, including anthrax
and smallpox. Many of these vaccines and drugs will be
stockpiled and used only in the event of a bioterrorist
attack. New environmental detectors will be developed
and deployed that will provide warning of a bioterrorist
attack. Access to select agents will be much more care-
fully controlled in the United States. The Select Agent
Rule already controls the shipment of 36 select agents.
The US Patriot Act, signed into law on October 26,
2001, also restricts certain individuals from possessing
select agents, including those from countries designated
by the United States as supporting terrorism. Soon
anyone possessing select agents in the United States will
have to register and gain authorization for possession.
Anyone in possession of a biological agent must have a
legitimate reason – those possessing any biological agent
for other than legitimate diagnostic or bona ﬁde research
activities face severe criminal penalties.
To be eﬀective, these regulations for access to dan-
gerous pathogens will need to be extended to other na-
tions. Harmonization of shipping of select agents is a
responsible means of lowering the risk of bioterrorism
that can be accomplished without having a serious
impact on legitimate research activities. Even though
such measures will not eliminate totally the risk of bi-
Table 3 Estimates of casualties from a hypothetical biological at-
tack based upon the release of 50 kg of various agents by an air-
craft ﬂying along a 2-km path upwind of a city of half a million
people [WHO Group of Consultants (1970) Health aspects of
chemical and biological weapons. WHO, Geneva]
Diseases Casualties Fatalities
Brucellosis 125,000 500
Q fever 125,000 150
Tularemia 125,000 30,000
Anthrax 125,000 95,000
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oterrorism, because pathogens such as B. anthracis are
widely distributed in nature, they are nevertheless ap-
propriate responsible measures that scientists should
support to reduce the risk of a repeat of the 2001 an-
thrax attacks on the United States.
Microbial ecologists need to extend the defenses
against bioterrorism to protect water, plants, and ani-
mals. Future bioterrorist attacks could target a nation’s
agricultural and environmental resources rather than
directly targeting humans. We need to strengthen the
Biological Weapons Convention to ensure compliance
with the edicts – never, under any circumstances, to
develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or re-
tain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins in
quantities that have no justiﬁcation for peaceful pur-
poses; not to transfer agents, toxins, weapons, equip-
ment, or means of delivery of biological weapons to
others; and to take necessary measures to prohibit and
prevent the development or acquisition of biological
weapons by a nation’s military or citizens. We need to
do so without impeding the necessary research for im-
proving our scientiﬁc understanding of the environment
and the world in which we live. We need to deﬁne the
boundary between defensive and oﬀensive biological
weapons research. In addition, we must deal with claims,
including those of the Sunshine Project, that oil and
plastic biodegradation and bioremediation research as
well as biological control of plant pests are forms of
biological warfare that are banned under the Biological
Weapons Convention. The Sunshine Project is particu-
larly concerned about the biological control eﬀorts that
might be used to control illicit-drug plants. Members
view eﬀorts in the United States to ﬁnd an eﬀective
means for biological control of coca plants as biological
warfare against Columbia, and against poppy plants as
biological warfare against Afghanistan that justiﬁed the
September 11 attacks. We need to reject such radical
claims against the eﬀorts of microbial ecologists to ﬁnd
eﬀective solutions to the world’s pollution problems. We
must strengthen the means of deterring bioterrorism
without causing a chilling eﬀect on critical scientiﬁc
research.
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